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On May 22, 2012, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled, in the case of Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), that an 
Italian law revoking the right to vote for life for those who are 
convicted of a crime and sentenced to at least five years 
imprisonment did not violate Article 3 of the First Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the “Convention”).1 Article 
3 of the First Protocol to the Convention binds its Contracting Parties 
to hold “free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under 
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the 
people in the choice of the legislature.”2 Denying citizens the right to 
vote as a result of a criminal conviction is an ancient practice known 
as criminal disenfranchisement.3 It is a form of civic punishment 
employed around the world in a variety of manners including 
 
 1. See Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (2012), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx? i=001-111044 (ruling that 
the Italian law on prisoner disenfranchisement did not violate Article 3 of the First 
Protocol). 
 2. Protocol One to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S. 9 [hereinafter First 
Protocol]. 
 3. See Morgan Macdonald, Note, Disproportionate Punishment: The Legality 
of Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1375, 1375 (2009) (tracing the 
history of criminal disenfranchisement back to Greek and Roman societies). 
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disenfranchisement for life, disenfranchisement only for certain 
crimes, and disenfranchisement for the duration of a prison 
sentence.4 
Part II of this comment will look first at the European Court of 
Human Rights generally and the doctrines it has developed for 
interpreting the Convention over the years. Part II will then discuss 
the history of the Court’s jurisprudence on Article 3 of the First 
Protocol. Part II will conclude by examining Article 31(3)(C) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as an option for 
alternative interpretations of the Convention, as well as looking at 
more recent treaties and international documents regarding voting 
rights and the treatment of prisoners. Part III of this comment will 
begin by arguing that the proportionality analysis used in Scoppola 
(No. 3) is inconsistent with the Court’s prior jurisprudence and that 
the proportionality analysis creates outcomes that are inconsistent 
with an evolutive interpretation of the Convention, falling outside a 
reasonable margin of appreciation. Furthermore, Part III will also 
argue that the Scoppola (No. 3) decision is not consistent with the 
Convention when analyzed in light of more recent international 
documents according to Article 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention. 
Part IV of this comment will make recommendations for how the 
Convention can be changed so that the voting rights of prisoners and 
convicts will be protected in the manner guaranteed by the 
Convention, including the addition of an explicit limitations clause 
on Article 3 of the First Protocol. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The background section of this comment will focus primarily on 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the 
“Court”). First, it will look at the background of the Court and the 
doctrines it has developed in interpreting the Convention. The next 
section will look at the prior decisions of the Court involving Article 
3 of the First Protocol, focusing on recent decisions involving 
criminal disenfranchisement. Finally, the last sections will look at an 
alternative method of interpretation under Article 31(3)(c) of the 
 
 4. See generally id. (analyzing differences in criminal disenfranchisement 
laws around the world, including Europe, in the context of Article 25 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR]). 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that allows for the use of 
external international documents on prisoner’s rights and voting 
rights.  
A. THE CONVENTION AND THE COURT 
In the wake of World War II and the subsequent Soviet 
domination of Eastern Europe, the Council of Europe conceived of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (the “Convention”) both 
as a statement of the common values of Western Europe and as a 
bulwark against communist subversion.5 To that end, the Council 
established strong enforcement mechanisms for the Convention.6 
These protections include allowing individuals to petition the Court 
for redress against a Contracting Party’s violation of their rights and 
making the decisions of the Court binding on the Contracting 
Parties.7 
1. Evolutive Interpretation Allows the ECHR to Incorporate Modern 
Norms of Human Rights into Articles of the Convention 
The Court has long acknowledged the need to harmonize 
Convention standards with social developments.8 This first became 
apparent in Golder v. United Kingdom, a case that decided whether 
the United Kingdom could restrain a prisoner from contacting legal 
counsel to discuss a lawsuit against a prison guard whom he believed 
 
 5. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms pmbl., Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter ECHR] 
(affirming the shared political traditions and ideals of the signatories, including 
freedom and the rule of law); see also DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 2008). 
 6. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 2–4 (describing the Convention’s 
evolution as analogous to a European Bill of Rights, with the Court in the role of a 
national constitutional court); see also Vassilis P. Tzevelekos, The Use of Article 
31(3)(C) of the VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR: An Effective Anti-
Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human 
Rights Teleology?, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 621, 626–27 (2010) (referring to the 
Convention as a “regional quasi-constitution” that reflects the increased integration 
of Europe). 
 7. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 4–5 (emphasizing that the protections 
offered by the Convention employ “strong enforcement mechanisms”). 
 8. See YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE 
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 
197 (2002) (tracing the origins of evolutive interpretation back to the mid-1970s). 
  
840 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:3 
libeled him, resulting in the denial of his parole.9 In deciding the case 
in Golder’s favor, the Court incorporated a right of access to a court 
into the Convention’s Article 6 right to a fair trial.10 The Court 
accomplished this by ascribing great importance to portions of the 
Convention that emphasize respect for the rule of law.11 The Court 
considered access to the courts as a key component of the rule of 
law.12 This landmark decision affirmed the nature of the Convention 
as a guarantee of human rights in Europe, not merely as a contract by 
which sovereign states agree to limit their sovereignty.13 The ruling 
also established the principle that the lack of an explicit provision in 
the text of an article of the Convention is not a complete barrier to 
granting an unenumerated right.14 
The Court elaborated on the process of expanding Convention 
protections in Tyrer v. United Kingdom, which concerned whether 
the judicial corporal punishment of a minor as a punishment for a 
criminal assault violated Article 3 of the Convention.15 In ruling for 
 
 9. See Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. 
A) at 9 (1975) (deciding in favor of the right of a prisoner to access counsel and a 
court to lodge a libel claim against one of his jailers). 
 10. See Golder, App. No. 4451/70, at 18 (concluding that article 6 provides the 
“right to a court,” which includes the right of access to the court); HARRIS ET AL., 
supra note 5, at 6 (“[O]ne could not suppose compliance with the rule of law 
without the possibility of taking disputes to court.”); see also George Letsas, 
Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer, 21 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 509, 516 (2010) (referring to the decision in Golder as bold and 
revolutionary for incorporating a right not explicitly included in the Convention 
text). 
 11. See Golder, App. No. 4451/70, at 17 (citing explicitly to Article 3 and the 
Preamble of the Convention as examples of sections stressing the importance of 
the rule of law). 
 12. See id. (stating that the rule of law only functions properly where 
individuals have access to courts). 
 13. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 6; see also Golder, App. No. 4451/70, 
at 564 (elaborating that to interpret the Convention any other way would create the 
possibility for Contracting Parties to arbitrarily restrict access to the court system 
without violating the Convention). 
 14. See Golder, App. No. 4451/70, at 18 (finding that article 6 provides a right 
of access to courts even though no specific provision grants it); see, e.g., Matthews 
v. United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 252, 267 (“The mere fact that a body was 
not envisaged by the drafters of the Convention cannot prevent that body from 
falling within the scope of the Convention.”). 
 15. See generally Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) 
(deciding that judicial corporal punishment of a minor violated the Convention’s 
Article 3 prohibition on degrading punishment). 
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the minor, the Court declared that “the Convention is a living 
instrument which . . . must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions.”16 This is commonly known as the evolutive 
interpretation17 and allows the Court to interpret the Convention to 
adapt to changing social attitudes.18 In Tyrer, the Court justified its 
ruling by explaining that a great majority of Contracting Parties did 
not allow judicial corporal punishment.19 However, a great majority 
of the Contracting Parties need not change their law before the Court 
will incorporate a new standard into the Convention.20 In the absence 
of a European consensus, the Court previously incorporated a right 
on the basis of a prevailing international trend.21 In these ways, the 
Court has used evolutive interpretation to expand the protections of 
the Convention in response to a variety of social developments.22 
2. The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine Allows the Court to Take 
Account of Unique National Conditions When Deciding a Case 
The margin of appreciation doctrine refers to the degree of 
 
 16. See id. at 15. 
 17. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (showing where the Court used 
modern-day norms to effect incremental change); see also Letsas, supra note 10, at 
527 (describing evolutive interpretation as the doctrine that most embodies the 
Court’s interpretive ethic). 
 18. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (referring to the Court as interpreting 
the general intentions of the parties, not the particular intentions of the parties in 
1950). 
 19. See Alastair Mowbray, The Creativity of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV 57, 61 (2010) (quoting from the Tyrer judgment and 
noting that the majority of Contracting Parties did not use juvenile corporal 
punishment); see also Marckx Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1979) (citing 
that a great majority of Contracting Parties had adopted a standard regarding 
children born out of wedlock as a reason for incorporating that standard into the 
Convention). 
 20. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 8 (describing the standard used by the 
Court in Goodwin v. United Kingdom as less demanding than a great majority 
standard). 
 21. See, e.g., Goodwin Christine v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(incorporating a right to legal recognition of gender identity for post-operative 
transsexuals based on a prevailing international trend, rather than a European 
consensus). 
 22. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (emphasizing that evolutive 
interpretation should not be used to introduce a right into the Convention that has 
no basis in its text, drawing a fine line between judicial interpretation and judicial 
legislation). 
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independence afforded to a State when applying the provisions of the 
Convention to its national laws.23 The Court first fully articulated this 
doctrine in Handyside v. United Kingdom, which dealt with whether 
the British government could restrain a publisher from publishing a 
book the government deemed obscene.24 In the absence of a 
standardized set of European morals, the Court determined that it is 
for the national authorities to decide what is necessary for the 
protection of morals in a democratic society.25 
The breadth of the margin of appreciation is dependent on the 
context in which it is applied.26 The margin is construed broadly 
where a Convention article does not have an explicit limitations 
clause, as is the case for criminal disenfranchisement.27 Articles 8 
through 11, which contain highly specific limitations clauses, stand 
in sharp contrast to those articles under which the Court grants States 
a broader margin of appreciation.28 Due to the specificity of the text 
of the articles, a narrower margin is applied by the Court.29 The 
margin is not only construed in the context of the Convention article 
in question. It is also responsive to national conditions, thus 
 
 23. See FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 37 (2d ed. 1996) (defining margins of 
appreciation as the outer limits of schemes of protection which are still acceptable 
under the Convention). 
 24. See generally Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 
(1976) (holding that seizure of a textbook intended for teenagers was justified by 
the protection of public morals). 
 25. See id. at 753–54 (stating that local authorities are in a better position than 
international judges to determine what violates the morals of that locality). 
 26. See JACOBS & WHITE, supra note 23, at 37 (referring to the subject matter 
and circumstances of a case as factors affecting the breadth of the margin); see also 
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 13 (contrasting the wide margin applied in cases 
involving national emergencies and public morals with the narrow margin applied 
in cases involving integral parts of a person’s identity, such as sexual orientation). 
 27. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 14 (citing the Court’s jurisprudence 
on Article 3 of the First Protocol as an example of where the lack of an express 
limitations clause has broadened the margin of appreciation). 
 28. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 5, art. 8(2) (limiting violations of the right to 
respect for private and family life to certain situations provided for by law which 
are necessary in a democratic society as in the Goodwin case, which found that 
denying legal recognition of the gender identity of post-operative transsexuals 
could not be justified as necessary in a democratic society). 
 29. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 9 (stating that the limitations clauses 
were placed in these articles, with an accordingly narrow margin of appreciation, 
to protect the most vital Convention rights). 
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reinforcing the Convention as the bare minimum human rights 
standard in Europe.30 That is to say, what is a legitimate aim in 
Latvia is not the same as in Turkey.31 
3. Under Proportionality Doctrine, the Court Weighs the Extent of 
the Violation of a Convention-Protected Right Against the State’s 
Margin of Appreciation 
The final interpretive doctrine at issue here is the doctrine of 
proportionality. Proportionality is the mechanism by which the Court 
determines whether a State exceeds its margin of appreciation.32 
Specifically, this principle asks if the deviation from the Convention 
“is not excessive in relation to the legitimate needs or interests that 
have caused it.”33 The goal of the doctrine is to find a fair balance 
“between the demands of the general interest of the community and 
the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental 
rights.”34 More narrowly, the Court requires that the means employed 
by a State be proportionate to the aim pursued.35  
In application, the doctrine has come under attack for not living up 
to its mandate,36 leading to decisions that can appear to be unjust and 
 
 30. See id. at 3 (describing the guarantees of the Convention as the minimum 
standard). 
 31. See, e.g., Ždanoka v. Latvia, App. No. 58278/00, 45 Eur. Ct. Rep. 17, 79-
80 (2006) (holding that Latvia was within the margin of appreciation in banning an 
unrepentant member of the Communist party from public office for life because of 
her actions during the 1991 revolution); Şahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98, 41 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 8, 30 (2005) (holding that Turkey did not violate the Convention by 
banning students from wearing the Islamic headscarf in public university lecture 
halls because of the Turkish government’s interest in maintaining a secular 
society). 
 32. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 193 (referring to proportionality as 
a yardstick measuring whether a national authority overstepped its margin of 
appreciation). 
 33. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 80 (3d ed. 1998) (characterizing the 
principle as a balance between the needs of the community and the rights of the 
individual). 
 34. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44-45 (1989) 
(holding that the UK would violate the Convention if it extradited a West German 
national to America where he could be sentenced to the death penalty). 
 35. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 14 (referring to proportionality as a 
way to prevent the overburdening of individual rights in pursuit of societal goods). 
 36. See generally Stavros Tsakyrakis, Proportionality: An Assault on Human 
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to value the interests of the community over the individual’s 
fundamental rights.37 Specifically, the Court in Otto-Preminger-
Institut v. Austria, which looked at whether local Austrian authorities 
could prevent the public exhibition of a film believed to be offensive 
to the majority Catholic population, held that the protection of 
religious peace and prevention of religious offense outweighed an 
individual’s right to freedom of expression.38 In circumstances such 
as these, where the Court decides whether a State exceeded its 
margin of appreciation, the Court assesses whether the national 
legislature considered issues of proportionality in drafting the law; 
the Court will find a law disproportionate if the State did not make 
any such considerations.39 
B. PRINCIPLES OF ECHR JURISPRUDENCE ON ARTICLE 3 OF 
PROTOCOL 1 
1. The Case of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, 1987 
The jurisprudence of the ECHR with regard to Article 3 of the 
First Protocol begins with the landmark case of Mathieu-Mohin and 
Clerfayt v. Belgium.40 Two French-speaking Belgian legislators 
brought the case, alleging illegal discrimination when they were 
 
Rights? (NYU Law Sch. Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 09/08, 2008), 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/08/080901.pdf (identifying situations 
where proportionality analysis failed to protect the rights of the individual by 
overemphasizing the social worth of the violation to society). 
 37. See, e.g., IA v. Turkey, App. No. 42578/98, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 249, 258 
(2005) (holding that seizure of a ‘blasphemous’ book did not violate the 
Convention because the interests of the public in respect for their religion 
outweighed the freedom of religious expression of the author); Otto-Preminger-
Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21 (1994) (holding that 
Austria did not violate Article 10 by seizing a film perceived to be offensive to 
Tyrolean Catholics). 
 38. See Otto-Preminger-Institut, App. No. 13470/87, at 59–60 (justifying the 
seizure of the film by saying that if it had been displayed, some people would feel 
their religious beliefs were under attack). 
 39. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 11–12 (stating that a law should not be 
found proportionate where there is no evidence that national authorities had 
considered its proportionality). 
 40. See Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1987) 
(stating that prior to 1987 the Court had not ruled on this issue); see also JACOBS & 
WHITE, supra note 23, at 270 (quoting the Mathieu-Mohin case for a statement of 
the scope of the right protected under Article 3 of Protocol 1). 
  
2013] A DISPROPORTIONATE RESPONSE 845 
denied admission, by law, to the local Flemish council because they 
took their legislative oaths in French.41 The pair alleged that by 
preventing them from being elected to the council because they 
chose to take their legislative oath in their native tongue, the law 
violated their rights under the Convention.42 In deciding the case, the 
Court set forth several principles that form the bedrock of 
jurisprudence for this comment.43  
The first of these principles is that these rights guaranteed under 
Article 3 are individual rights, despite the article’s ambiguous 
wording.44 The second principle is that the rights are not absolute 
and, in the absence of an express limitations clause, are subject to 
implied limitations with a wide margin of appreciation afforded to 
State parties.45 The last principle is that, in limiting the right, a State 
must not curtail it to the extent that it “impairs the essence of the 
right and deprives it of its effectiveness.”46 The Court evaluates this 
standard by determining if the narrowing of the right is in “pursuit of 
a legitimate aim and that the means employed are not 
disproportionate.”47  
 
 41. See Mathieu-Mohin, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19, 21 (explaining that 
Belgian law requires members of the Flemish council to take their legislative oath 
in Flemish). 
 42. See id. at 21 (implying that the language requirement thwarts the free 
expression of the people in the choice of legislature). 
 43. See Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 12 (2012), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx? i=001-111044 (citing to 
Mathieu-Mohin for a statement of the Court’s general principles on Article 3). See 
generally HARRIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 713–14 (summarizing the main principles 
of the Mathieu-Mohin judgment and noting that the Court acknowledges the 
sensitive issues a State faces in managing its electoral process). 
 44. See Mathieu-Mohin, 113 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22-23 (clarifying that 
Article 3 of the First Protocol is worded not to merely create obligations between 
the States, but to create a positive obligation on the States to hold free elections for 
the people). 
 45. See id. (affirming that the States are free to institute any particular electoral 
system so long as it is democratic). 
 46. See id. at 23. 
 47. See id. 
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2. Criminal Disenfranchisement Decisions of the ECHR 
a. The Case of Labita v. Italy, 2000 
The Court first decided a criminal disenfranchisement case using 
the Mathieu-Mohin principles in 2000, in Labita v. Italy.48 Benedetto 
Labita was arrested in 1992 on suspicion of being a mafioso.49 He 
was disenfranchised as part of a set of temporary preventive 
measures imposed upon him by virtue of his being an accused 
mafioso.50 Labita was disenfranchised after his acquittal in 1995 until 
the term of disenfranchisement expired in late 1997.51 
In analyzing Labita’s disenfranchisement under the Mathieu-
Mohin principles, the Court found that the Government’s articulated 
aim of discouraging mafia influence on the Italian political system 
was legitimate.52 However, the Court found his disenfranchisement 
disproportionate because it was imposed after his acquittal, which 
removed the basis for imposing disenfranchisement in the first 
place.53 This appears to impose a requirement that, to be 
proportionate, the punishment must bear a relevant and sufficient 
link to the legitimate aim.54 The Court implicitly afforded the Italian 
government a wide margin of appreciation in this case because of the 
historical threat the mafia has posed to Italian political structures.55 
 
 48. See Labita v. Italy, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 148. 
 49. See id. at 102 (explaining that Labita was suspected of running a financial 
company for his brother-in-law, who authorities believed to be the head of the 
local mafia, based on the cooperating testimony of a former mafioso). 
 50. See id. at 1246 (citing Article 32 of Presidential Decree 223 of March 20, 
1967 as authority for the removal of civil rights). 
 51. See id. at 1244–45 (detailing the timeline of the preventive measures 
imposed upon Labita). 
 52. See id. at 1266 (framing the aim of the government in terms of the mafia’s 
risk to Italian politics because mafia members would vote for other mafia 
members). 
 53. See id. (stating that the acquittal nullified any suspicion of mafia 
involvement that would have justified the imposition of disenfranchisement). 
 54. See William Ashby Powers, Comment, Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2): A 
First Look at Prisoner Disenfranchisement by the European Court of Human 
Rights, 21 CONN. J. INT’L L. 243, 266–67 (2006) (“This ‘lack of concrete evidence’ 
severed the sufficient relationship that had existed between disenfranchisement and 
the government’s aim of preventing the mafia from influencing elections.”). 
 55. See generally Benjamin Scotti, Comment, RICO Vs. 416-bis: A 
Comparison of U.S. and Italian Anti-Organized Crime Legislation, 25 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP L. REV. 143 (detailing the mafia’s past and current influence on 
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b. The Case of Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2004-2006 
On March 30, 2004, a seven-judge Chamber of the Court handed 
down a judgment in the case of Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2).56 Using 
an axe, John Hirst killed his elderly landlady.57 For this crime, he was 
convicted and sentenced to a discretionary sentence of life 
imprisonment, with a fourteen-year tariff.58 Pursuant to the 
Representation of the People Act 1983, Hirst lost the right to vote for the 
term of his imprisonment due to his conviction and custodial sentence.59 
The British government argued before the Chamber that the Act 
pursued the legitimate aims of “preventing crime and punishing 
offenders” as well as “enhancing civic responsibility and respect for 
the rule of law.”60 In evaluating these aims, the Chamber relied 
heavily on the analysis of the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of 
Sauvé v. Canada (No. 2).61 The Canadian Court found that neither 
aim bore a rational link to criminal disenfranchisement and that 
disenfranchisement may instead undermine those aims.62 However, 
the Chamber declined to rule on the aim, citing the margin of 
appreciation, and chose instead to find the law disproportionate.63 
This construction reflects the nature of the Chamber’s analysis, with 
 
Italian politics). 
 56. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No. 74025/01, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 189, 220 (2005) (holding that the 1983 Representation of the People Act 
violated Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human 
Rights). 
 57. See Powers, supra note 54, at 269. 
 58. See Hirst (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 214 (explaining that a tariff is 
the part of the sentence relating to retribution and deterrence, allowing for further 
imprisonment based on the parole authority’s belief that the offender is a danger). 
 59. See id. at 197 (citing Section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 
1983, stating that a person who is convicted of a crime and receives a custodial 
sentence shall be banned from voting in parliamentary or any other elections for 
the term of his imprisonment). 
 60. See id. at 207. 
 61. See id. at 201 (acknowledging the differences in the Canadian Charter and 
the European Convention while still finding the analysis of the Canadian court 
relevant to the circumstances). 
 62. See id.; Sauvé v. Canada (No. 2), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.) (rejecting the 
arguments of the Canadian government that there is a “rational link” between the 
legitimate aims argued and the disenfranchisement penalty). 
 63. See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 214 
(refraining from ruling on the aims of the governments because of the vast 
disparity in penal practices among member states). 
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legitimate aim and proportionality forming independent bases for 
finding a law in violation of Article 3 of the First Protocol.64 
In finding the law disproportionate, the Chamber focused on the 
large number of people (more than 70,000) affected by the 
disenfranchisement as well as its automatic, arbitrary and 
indiscriminate nature.65 The Chamber also assessed whether the 
Parliament considered issues of proportionality in passing the law 
and found that it did not.66 The Chamber concluded by determining 
that a narrower tailoring of the law could be proportionate but that 
the law as it stood fell outside any “acceptable margin of 
appreciation.”67 
Upon appeal from the British Government, a full Grand Chamber 
of the Court ruled on the case on October 6, 2005.68 This Court, too, 
found the law in violation of the article but altered some of the 
reasoning of the lower Chamber.69 The Court took particular care at 
the beginning to emphasize the vital nature of the right to vote as a 
right that upholds the legitimacy of government and not a privilege 
that may be revoked.70 However, contrary to the reticence of the 
Chamber, the Court emphatically endorsed the aims of the 
government.71  
 
 64. Compare Powers, supra note 54, at 283–84 (describing the bifurcated 
nature of the Court’s inquiry), with Powers, supra note 54, at 284 (elaborating on 
the Canadian style of analysis which balances the aim, however illegitimate, 
against the deprivation of the right and looks for a “rational link” between the 
two). 
 65. See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 216 (describing the effect on the 
people as arbitrary and indiscriminate because there is no consideration of the 
particular crime or of individual circumstances). 
 66. See id. at 204 (stating that Parliament never weighed the competing 
interests of the effects on the prisoner and the social value of disenfranchisement). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 220 (upholding the judgment of the 
Chamber that the British law violated Article 3 of the First Protocol). 
 69. See Powers, supra note 54, at 289–93 (explaining that the Court discounted 
the analysis initially used in the Chamber’s decision). 
 70. See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. , at 201 (elaborating on the evolution of 
voting rights from a time when only elite groups could vote to today where 
universal suffrage is the standard, further stating that any departure from the 
principle undermines the rule of law). 
 71. See id. at 214 (disregarding both the analysis of the Canadian court from 
Sauvé (No. 2) and doubts about the efficacy of the measures in achieving the 
articulated aims, which the Court did not find incompatible per se with the 
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In its analysis of the law’s proportionality, the Court endorsed the 
reasoning of the Chamber.72 The Court further criticized the 
indiscriminate nature of the disenfranchisement by noting that the 
punishment was an ancillary penalty not announced during 
sentencing.73 
c. The Case of Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), 2012 
On May 22, 2012, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that 
Italy did not violate Franco Scoppola’s rights under the Convention 
when it disenfranchised him pursuant to his conviction and life 
sentence for murdering his wife.74 The law that allowed for 
Scoppola’s disenfranchisement, Presidential Decree no. 223/1967, 
provides that all those sentenced to five years’ imprisonment or more 
shall be banned from running for public office for life.75 
The Court began its analysis by adopting the reasoning of the 
Hirst (No. 2) Court with regard to legitimate aim.76 Turning next to 
the proportionality inquiry, the Court utilized the analysis of the 
Hirst (No. 2) Court, examining the automatic, arbitrary, and 
indiscriminate nature of the law.77 As to the arbitrary nature of the 
law, the Court differentiated the Italian law by emphasizing that the 
length of disenfranchisement varies according to the length of 
sentence and only applies to those with a sentence of three years or 
 
Convention). 
 72. See id. at 217. 
 73. See id. at 215 (“[T]he criminal courts in England and Wales make no 
reference to disenfranchisement and it is not apparent . . . that there is any direct 
link between the facts of any individual case and the removal of the right.”). 
 74. See Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2012), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx? i=001-111044 (detailing the 
particulars of Scoppola’s crime and the proceedings against him). 
 75. See id. at 5–6 (correlating voting bans to the duration an individual is 
imprisoned, ranging from a five-year ban for those sentenced three to five years to 
a possible lifting of the ban three years after release). 
 76. See id. at 13 (accepting that disenfranchisement serves the aims of 
preventing crime and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of 
law). 
 77. See id. at 14 (“[W]hen disenfranchisement affects a group of people 
generally, automatically, and indiscriminately, based solely on the fact that they 
are serving a prison sentence, irrespective of the nature or gravity of the offense 
and their individual circumstances, it is not compatible with Article 3 of Protocol 
Number 1.”). 
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longer.78 The Court differentiated the indiscriminate nature of the 
British law from the Italian law by pointing to the Italian sentencing 
criteria, which allows for the court to take account individual 
circumstances when determining the length of sentence.79 
Furthermore, the Court also felt that mechanisms of the Italian 
penitentiary system that allowed for reductions in sentence length 
based on good behavior in connection with the possibility of 
regaining the right to vote three years after release mitigated the 
indiscriminate nature of the law.80 
C. ARTICLE 31(3)(C) OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
THAT INCORPORATES EXTERNAL RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention states that, along with 
all other internal context, external rules of international law 
applicable in the relations of the parties may be considered when 
interpreting the terms of a treaty.81 The policy underlying this 
practice reflects a need to harmonize regimes of international law 
through interpretation in light of evolving international norms.82 In 
that respect, the policy is similar to the Court’s own internal doctrine 
of evolutive interpretation.  
Article 31(3)(c) analysis is a practice that is familiar to the Court, 
having applied it in various contexts in recent years.83 In employing a 
 
 78. See id. at 16 (explaining that because the British law disenfranchises people 
sentenced for more minor offenses than the Italian law, it is less proportionate). 
 79. See id. (citing the Italian sentencing guidelines as a factor supporting the 
proportionate nature of the sentence because the length of sentence determines 
disenfranchisement). 
 80. See id. (emphasizing the possibility of early release and rehabilitation as 
major factors for finding the Italian system proportionate). 
 81. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (allowing for subsequent applications of the treaty to be used to 
interpret both the treaty’s context and application). 
 82. See Julian Arato, Constitutional Transformation in the ECTHR: 
Strasbourg’s Expansive Recourse to External Rules of International Law, 37 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 349, 355 (2012) (emphasizing that a 31(3)(c) analysis should 
derive new meaning for a provision of a treaty from external sources). 
 83. See, e.g., Demir v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54 
(2008) (interpreting municipal employees collective bargaining rights); Al-Adsani 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 11 (2002) (analyzing 
sovereign immunity). 
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31(3)(c) analysis, the Court examines a variety of documents, 
including other treaties, non-binding documents published by bodies 
of the Council of Europe, and non-binding documents of other 
international organizations.84 This is shown in both the Scoppola (No. 
3) and Hirst (No. 2) decisions, which reprint sections of relevant 
international documents, though neither case directly cites Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention.85 
D. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS ON VOTING RIGHTS 
AND THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 
Having established that international documents can play a 
significant role in interpreting the Convention, it is important now to 
examine relevant documents on the rights of prisoners and the right 
to vote. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is 
the predominant international treaty in these areas, though several 
other European and international documents provide additional 
clarity.86  
1. International Documents on the Rights of Prisoners Emphasize the 
Reintroduction of the Prisoner to Society as the Primary Goal of 
Incarceration 
Article 10 of the ICCPR relates to the general treatment of 
prisoners, mandating that they be treated with the respect and the 
dignity of the human person and that the primary aim of the 
 
 84. See Arato, supra note 82, at 376–77 (demonstrating the Court’s use of the 
nonbinding recommendations of the Council of Europe’s European Commission 
for Democracy Through Law (“Venice Commission”) as well as the nonbinding 
recommendations of two committees of the International Labor Organization). 
 85. See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No 74025/01, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 193, 198–99 (2005) (citing the ICCPR, the CoE’s European Prison Rules, and 
a report of the Venice Commission); see also Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 
126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 7 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx? i=001-111044 (citing the ICCPR, the Venice Commission report, as 
well as a report of the United Nations Human Rights Committee as relevant 
international materials on the issues of prisoners’ rights and voting rights). 
 86. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16, 
1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also 
Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
(http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4& 
chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (noting that all members of the 
Council of Europe are also signatories to the ICCPR). 
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penitentiary system be the reformation and social rehabilitation of 
the prisoner.87 There are several other international documents that 
reaffirm Article 10’s principles; for example, Principle Ten of the 
United Nations Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners states 
that “favourable conditions shall be created for the reintegration of 
the ex-prisoner into society.”88 Aside from other international 
organizations, the Council of Europe itself stated these principles in 
several different documents, including the European Prison Rules.89 
2. International Documents Regarding Voting Rights and Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Recommend the Abolition of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement in Most Contexts 
Article 25 of the ICCPR mandates that the right to vote not be 
impeded by “unreasonable restrictions.”90 The meaning of this article 
is not clear on its face; however, it has been interpreted as 
prohibiting all but the most narrowly defined criminal 
 
 87. See ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 10(1) (stating that prisoners are entitled to a 
basic level of human dignity and that the goal of the penitentiary system shall be 
the rehabilitation of the prisoner). 
 88. Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111, U.N. 
Doc A/RES/45/111 (Mar. 28, 1991); see also First United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Aug. 30, 1955, Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Rule 61, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36e8.html (stating that the treatment of 
prisoners shall emphasize their continuing part in society, not their exclusion from 
it). 
 89. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Recommendation Rec(2006)(2) of the Comm. of 
Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules, Rules 5–7 (adopted 
Jan. 11, 2006), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=955747&Site%20=CM& 
BackColorInternet=9999CC&BackColorIntranet=FFBB55&BackColorLogged=F
FAC75 (last visited Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter European Prison Rules] 
(emphasizing that life in prison should approximate life outside of prison as closely 
as possible); see also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Recommendation Rec(2003)23 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Management by Prison 
Administrators of Life Sentence and other Long-term Prisoners, Recommendations 
2–5, available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=75267&Site=CM 
(recommending prisoners’ day to day lifestyle be comparable to the safety, 
organization, and level of personal responsibility experienced in society). 
 90. See ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 25 (“Every citizen shall have the right and 
opportunity . . . without unreasonable restrictions: (b) To vote and to be elected at 
genuine periodic elections which shall be held by . . . secret ballot, guaranteeing 
the free expression of the will of the electors.”). 
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disenfranchisement laws.91 Several documents promulgated by the 
Council of Europe make a clearer distinction, particularly Resolution 
1459 of the Parliamentary Assembly, issued in 2005, which 
recommends restriction of disenfranchisement to crimes against the 
democratic process.92 Furthermore, in 2002 the European 
Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), an 
advisory body of the Council of Europe, made official 
recommendations that disenfranchisement only be imposed for 
serious criminal offenses, and even then only by the express decision 
of a court of law.93 
III. ANALYSIS 
This section will argue that the decision in Scoppola (No. 3) is 
inconsistent with the European Convention on Human Rights. This 
section will look first at how the analysis of proportionality in 
Scoppola (No. 3) is inconsistent with the analysis employed by the 
Court in Hirst (No. 2). Second, it will examine how the decision in 
Scoppola (No. 3) conflicts with western European norms as reflected 
in the margin of appreciation and an evolutive interpretation of the 
Convention. Finally, the last part of this section will employ an 
analysis of the Convention under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties to show that the decision in 
Scoppola (No. 3) conflicts with more recent international and 
European norms regarding voting rights and the treatment of 
prisoners. 
 
 91. See generally Macdonald, supra note 3 (categorizing global criminal 
disenfranchisement laws based on their compliance with the ICCPR). 
 92. See EUR. PARL. ASS., Abolition of Restrictions on the Right to Vote, Res. 
1459 (2005) (justifying the limitations on disenfranchisement by reinforcing the 
importance of the right to vote and the rehabilitative nature of imprisonment). 
 93. See European Commission for Democracy Through Law, July 5–6, Oct. 
18–19, 2002 Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Op. No. 190/2002, 
Section 1.1(d)(iv)–(v) (Oct. 20 2002), http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-
AD(2002)023rev-e.pdf [hereinafter Venice Commission] (predicating 
disenfranchisement and the loss of political rights only in cases of mental 
incapacity or criminal convictions). 
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A. THE PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS IN SCOPPOLA (NO. 3)  
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS  
IN HIRST (NO. 2) 
The European Court of Human Rights employs a proportionality 
analysis to determine if a State exceeds its margin of appreciation, by 
weighing the limitation of the right against the discretion afforded 
the state in forming its national policies.94 The Court, however, is not 
strictly bound by its own precedent; in other words, the Court is not 
absolutely required to follow its own judgments.95 The Court does 
not depart from its own decisions lightly, but it has done so with its 
analysis of proportionality in Scoppola.96 
The first aspect of the proportionality analysis employed by the 
Court in both cases is the analysis of the indiscriminate nature of the 
disenfranchisement.97 Where the Court in Hirst (No. 2) felt that the 
disenfranchisement of all convicted prisoners serving custodial 
sentences was indiscriminate, the Court in Scoppola (No. 3) felt that 
the disenfranchisement of all those convicted to sentences of three 
years or more was not indiscriminate.98 The conclusion reached by 
the Court in Scoppola (No. 3) is inconsistent with Hirst (No. 2) 
because it focuses on the length of the sentence when the 
determinative factor should be that the penalty applies without regard 
to particulars of the crime, which is cited as a major factor in the 
 
 94. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 14 (emphasizing that an intense 
standard of proportionality review reflects a narrow margin of appreciation). 
 95. See Goodwin Christine v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 471 
(“While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, it is in 
the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it 
should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous 
cases.”); see also Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 
(2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx? i=001-111044 
(applying the principle stated in the Goodwin case to the Scoppola (No. 3) case). 
 96. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 14 (deciding that comparative-law is 
inclined to be more liberal with granting prisoners voting rights). 
 97. See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), App. No 74025/01, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 193, 216 (2005) (emphasizing the blunt nature of the 1983 Representation of 
the People Act because it strips the convention-protected right to vote from a 
significant number of people in an indiscriminate manner). 
 98. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 16 (finding the Italian 
disenfranchisement law proportionate in part because it lets prisoners serving less 
than three years retain their voting rights). 
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Hirst (No. 2) decision.99 This inconsistency is noted in Judge 
Björgvinsson’s dissent in Scoppola (No. 3).100 It is also noted in the 
Scoppola (No. 3) Chamber opinion.101 Furthermore, while the Court 
in Scoppola (No. 3) refers to the Italian sentencing guidelines as a 
factor weighing against finding the law indiscriminate, the Court in 
Hirst (No. 2) considered no such guidelines in that decision.102  
Another element of inconsistency arises from the Court’s point in 
Hirst (No. 2) that the proportionality of the punishment is affected by 
whether or not it is specifically announced at sentencing.103 The 
Court in Hirst (No. 2) points to this as a factor in finding the law 
disproportionate, even going so far as to imply that 
disenfranchisement should be considered as a separate issue at 
sentencing.104 This concept does not appear at all in the Court’s 
analysis in Scoppola (No. 3), a point seized upon by the dissent.105 
 
 99. See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 216 (describing the disproportionate 
nature of the English disenfranchisement law as applying automatically, 
indiscriminately, and without regard to any individual circumstances of the crime). 
 100. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 19 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting) 
(“While the Italian legislation may seem for this reason to be more lenient in 
comparison with that of the United Kingdom, it is stricter in the sense that it 
deprives prisoners of their right to vote beyond the duration of their prison 
sentence and, for a large group of prisoners, for life.”). 
 101. See id. at 10 (making the point that the only factor in the 
disenfranchisement was the length of the custodial sentence). It is unclear what 
other particular arguments were raised in the Chamber decision in Scoppola (No. 
3), as that judgment has not yet been translated into English. 
 102. See id. at 16 (“In the Court’s opinion the legal provisions in 
Italy defining the circumstances in which individuals may be deprived of the right 
to vote show the legislature’s concern to adjust the application of the measure 
to the particular circumstances of the case in hand, taking into account such factors 
as the gravity of the offense committed and the conduct of the offender.”). 
 103. See Hirst, 2005 IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 215869 (explicitly noting that British 
courts do not announce the disenfranchisement penalty at sentencing). 
 104. See id. at 212–213 (stating that an independent court and an adversarial 
procedure provide a safeguard against arbitrariness and disproportionality). 
 105. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 19 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Italian courts did not make any specific reference to [Scoppola’s] 
disenfranchisement, and it is not apparent, beyond the fact that a court considered 
it appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment, that there is any direct link 
between the facts of his case and the removal of his right to vote”); see also Frodl 
v. Austria, App. No. 20201/04, Eur. H.R. Rep. (2010), 8 http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-98132 (interpreting Hirst (No. 2) as requiring the 
independent determination of a judge to impose disenfranchisement, a proposition 
rejected by the Scoppola (No. 3) Court). 
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Indeed, in the Labita case, the Italian government explicitly argued 
for disenfranchisement because of the unique threats posed by the 
mafia to the Italian legal system.106 Ultimately, because the Italian 
law buries the disenfranchisement penalty as an ancillary penalty to 
the loss of the right to hold public office whereas the English law 
states it outright, the English law is actually more proportionate in 
this respect than the Italian law.107 
The final element of the proportionality analysis employed in 
Hirst (No. 2) is the use of the margin of appreciation to examine the 
nature of domestic legislation.108 In Hirst (No. 2), the fact that 
Parliament never considered the proportionality of the law weighed 
heavily in the Court’s decision to find the law disproportionate.109 In 
Scoppola, however, the Court engaged in no such discussion of 
legislative history, and indeed seemed not to factor legislative history 
into its decision at all, though its conspicuous absence was noted by 
the dissent.110 
The analysis of proportionality in the Scoppola (No. 3) case is 
inconsistent with the analysis in the Hirst (No. 2) case. Of particular 
note are the indiscriminate nature of the disenfranchisement, the 
 
 106. See Labita v. Italy, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 148 (declaring that the aim of 
the government in disenfranchising Labita was to prevent the mafia from 
influencing elections by voting for pro-mafia politicians, which the court 
recognized may pose a threat to Italian politics); see also HARRIS ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 717 (discussing how the court explicitly linked restrictions on the right to 
vote based on age and citizenship to specific issues in the electoral system). 
 107. Compare Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 5 (“In the event of a lifetime ban 
from public office . . . the convicted person shall be deprived of the right to vote . . 
. and all other political rights.”), with Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 197 (“A 
convicted person during the time that he is detained in a penal institution in 
pursuance of his sentence . . . is legally incapable of voting at any parliamentary or 
local election.”). See also Scoppola, App. No. 126/0519, at 19 (Björgvinsson, J., 
dissenting) (emphasizing that there is no clear link between denying a person the 
right to run for office and denying a person the right to vote). 
 108. See Powers, supra note 54, at 287 (discussing how the Chamber in Hirst 
(No. 2) evaluated the conduct of the Parliament in passing the RPA). 
 109. Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., at 197 (describing the debates of Parliament 
on the 1983 Representation of the People Act as completely lacking in any 
substance regarding the proportionality of or justifications for disenfranchisement). 
 110. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 19 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting) 
(opining that the Italian legislature, like the British Parliament, never assessed the 
proportionality of the measure, and emphasizing that the law disenfranchises a 
large number of Italian criminals beyond the length of their custodial sentence). 
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automatic nature of the disenfranchisement, applying the 
disenfranchisement upon sentencing without notifying the convict, 
and the fact that neither country ever considered proportionality 
when passing its respective laws. If the Court had applied the 
proportionality analysis consistently, it would have found the Italian 
law just as disproportionate as the British law was seven years prior.  
B. THE DECISION IN SCOPPOLA (NO. 3) IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
WESTERN EUROPEAN NORMS OF PENAL CONDUCT 
At its ratification, the Council of Europe intended the European 
Convention on Human Rights to be a statement of the common 
values of democracy and the rule of law held by the western 
European states.111 Since the end of the Cold War, however, the 
integration of eastern European states that do not share these 
common historical values has caused some difficulty in reconciling 
the new signatories with the existing norms under the Convention, 
which is reflected in Scoppola (No. 3).112 
1. The Decision in Scoppola (No. 3) Reflects an Overly Broad 
Margin of Appreciation in the Area of Voting Rights 
One of the arguments advanced by the Italian government in 
Scoppola (No. 3) is that there is no European consensus on criminal 
disenfranchisement and that this allows the Court to construe the 
margin of appreciation broadly.113 Accordingly, the breadth of the 
margin of appreciation on this issue is repeatedly referred to by the 
Court in making its decision.114 While it is true that there is no single 
 
 111. See ECHR, supra note 5, at 5 (explaining that states that ratified the 
Convention shared political traditions and ideals of freedom and rule of law). 
 112. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 216 (expressing the difficulty of 
applying European consensus views when consensus views do not reflect a more 
progressive construction of the Convention). 
 113. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 11 (explaining the argument of the 
Italian government that there has historically been a broad margin of appreciation 
in the area of criminal disenfranchisement). Contra id. at 17 (Björgvinsson, J., 
dissenting) (opining that while the margin of appreciation for the development of a 
national electoral system is appropriately broad, the margin of appreciation for a 
withdrawal of the right to vote, which directly affects the individual’s ability to 
participate in the political process, should be much narrower). 
 114. See id. at 11, 17 (“The rights enshrined in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are 
not absolute . . . . There are numerous ways of organizing and running electoral 
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European approach on the issue, there is more nuance among 
European states than is initially apparent. As of the Scoppola (No. 3) 
decision, nineteen of forty-three Contracting States had no 
restrictions on prisoner voting, seven imposed a ban on all 
incarcerated prisoners, and the remaining sixteen adopted an 
intermediate approach, disenfranchising some prisoners.115 
The Court in Scoppola (No. 3) states that the purpose of the 
margin of appreciation on the issue of electoral systems is to allow a 
State to incorporate its own cultural history and diversity into a 
unique democratic vision.116 However, of the seven Contracting 
Parties that disenfranchise all prisoners, all but the United Kingdom 
are former Soviet states without a strong history of democracy and 
the rule of law, having joined the Convention in the last twenty 
years.117 Indeed, a study of European disenfranchisement laws found 
that general criminal disenfranchisement is associated with a 
significantly lower level of political democratization.118 General 
disenfranchisement policies are also highly correlated with the death 
penalty, a practice that the Council of Europe recommends be 
abolished, further showing that the penal policies of these post-
Soviet nations are out of step with the norms of the rest of Europe.119 
 
systems and a wealth of differences . . . in historical development, cultural 
diversity, and political thought within Europe.”). 
 115. See id. at 10–11 (categorizing the practices of the Council of Europe 
member states on the issue of criminal disenfranchisement). See generally Greens 
and M.T. v. United Kingdom, App. Nos 60041/08 and 60054/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep 
21 (2011) (noting that Parliament failed to take action to change the law that was 
found in violation in Hirst (No. 2)). 
 116. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 17 (emphasizing the variety of political 
systems possible under the democratic process). 
 117. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms Chart of Signatures and Ratifications, 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&
CL=ENG (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Council of Europe Signatures 
and Ratifications] (showing that Armenia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
and Russia all ratified the First Protocol between the years 1992 and 2002). 
 118. See Christopher Uggen et al., Punishment and Social Exclusion: National 
Differences in Prisoner Disenfranchisement, in CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 71 (Alec Ewald & Brandon Rottinghaus eds., 
2009) (finding that European nations with no criminal disenfranchisement had a 
mean democratization index score of 30.15, whereas nations with full criminal 
disenfranchisement had a mean score of 24.49). 
 119. See id. (showing that the mean likelihood of a nation maintaining the death 
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Further reducing the clarity on this issue is the vast disparity of 
practices among the sixteen states that impose a limited form of 
criminal disenfranchisement.120 At one end of the spectrum, there are 
States such as Italy, which disenfranchise a significant number of 
offenders based on the length of sentence. On the other end are 
States like Germany, which restrict criminal disenfranchisement to 
particular crimes and leave the determination of whether to impose 
disenfranchisement to the discretion of a court.121 
The degree of variation in penal policy is significantly reduced 
when one looks at States that ratified the Convention at or near its 
inception, like Italy.122 Of these fifteen states, Italy stands only with 
the United Kingdom and Turkey in maintaining an automatic 
criminal disenfranchisement law that does not provide for judicial 
determination of the penalty.123 If the consensus view of only these 
 
penalty was 0.333 for general disenfranchisement countries and 0.083 for non-
disenfranchising countries); see also EUR. PARL. ASS., Position of the 
Parliamentary Assembly as Regards the Council of Europe Member and Observer 
States Which Have not Abolished the Death Penalty, Doc. No. 10911, 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc06/EDOC10
911.htm, Apr. 21, 2006 (recommending that all member and observer countries to 
the Council of Europe abolish the death penalty in accordance with previous 
Council recommendations). 
 120. Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 11 (listing Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, and Turkey as 
states that have limited criminal disenfranchisement). 
 121. See Nora V. Demleitner, U.S Felon Disenfranchisement: Parting Ways 
with Western Europe, supra note 188, at 86 (characterizing German law as only 
allowing disenfranchisement as a separate punishment for a narrowly defined set 
of crimes either directly relating to voter fraud or that target the foundations of the 
German state; in the year 2003, only two people were sentenced to 
disenfranchisement under these laws); see also LALEH ISPAHANI, Voting Rights 
and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfranchisement 
Laws, in CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 29 
(Alec Ewald & Brandon Rottinghaus eds., 2009) (offering Norway as an example 
where the law specifically states that a court must explicitly impose 
disenfranchisement, and pointing out that such punishment is “very rare”). 
 122. See Council of Europe Signatures and Ratifications, supra note 117 
(showing that Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom all ratified the First Protocol before 1960). 
 123. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 11 (differentiating the sixteen states 
with limited disenfranchisement according to whether the decision to impose 
disenfranchisement remains in the discretion of the court). 
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states were to apply in forming a margin of appreciation, the Court in 
Scoppola (No. 3) would have almost certainly found that the Italian 
disenfranchisement law violated the Convention because it does not 
provide for such judicial discretion, especially considering that the 
Court had previously held that a similar British law violated the 
Convention.124 Ultimately, the end of the cold war and the resulting 
expansion of the Council of Europe created a wide variation in 
criminal disenfranchisement policies among its Contracting States. 
This expansion broadened the margin of appreciation on criminal 
disenfranchisement, allowing the Italian law to be upheld in 
Scoppola (No. 3) even though it is out of step with the majority of 
western European nations. 
2. The Decision in Scoppola (No. 3) Has a Deleterious Effect on 
Evolutive Interpretation 
The broadening of the margin of appreciation, as seen in Scoppola 
(No. 3), also has implications for the use of evolutive interpretation 
by the Court, specifically the possibility that the adoption of 
consensus views drags the standard of human rights down to the 
lowest common denominator.125 Evolutive interpretation is based on 
the principle that changing social attitudes should be accounted for 
when broadening the protections under the convention.126 The 
decision in Scoppola (No. 3) therefore can be viewed as a kind of 
devolutive judgment, removing the protections seemingly guaranteed 
by Hirst (No. 2), a view expressed by Judge Björgvinsson in his 
dissent.127 
 
 124. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.ii (discussing the resolution of the Hirst 
(No. 2) case). 
 125. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 196 (theorizing that an evolutive 
interpretation may result in sacrificing the quality of the Convention standard of 
human rights in search of a uniform European approach); see also Paolo G. 
Carozza, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights: 
Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1217, 1231 (1998) (opining that the integration of eastern 
European nations with divergent legal and political traditions will necessarily 
result in a lowering of established standards). 
 126. See discussion supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the rationale underlying the 
doctrine of evolutive interpretation). 
 127. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 26–29 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting) 
(lamenting that the decision in Scoppola (No. 3) has rolled back any protections for 
prisoner’s voting rights that were gained in the Hirst (No. 2) decision). 
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In Scoppola (No. 3), the Court took the protection granted in Hirst 
(No. 2) and, mindful of the lack of a European consensus on the 
issue, still decided to reverse itself.128 The use of comparative law in 
evolutive interpretation is legitimized because it brings interpretation 
of the Convention in line with recognized human rights standards.129 
Therefore, the judgment in Scoppola (No. 3) caused the Court to 
become inconsistent with the recognized human rights standard, 
which disfavors criminal disenfranchisement in almost all contexts, 
especially when there is no judicial determination of the 
disenfranchisement penalty.130 
Beyond simply reversing the evolutive trend of the Court in the 
area of criminal disenfranchisement, the decision in Scoppola (No. 3) 
also raises concerns about the legitimacy of the Court, as it makes 
the Court seem inconsistent and unpredictable.131 The inconsistency 
is particularly problematic in this instance because the judgment in 
Scoppola (No. 3) drastically reduces the scope of a protection that 
had seemingly been granted in Hirst (No. 2), contrary to the purpose 
of evolutive interpretation, which is to broaden the Court’s 
interpretation of Convention terms and bring that interpretation in 
line with modern norms.132 
 
 128. See id. at 11, 23-24 (emphasizing the lack of European consensus on the 
issue of disenfranchisement, especially on whether an independent determination 
of the penalty is necessary). 
 129. See HARRIS et al., supra note 5, at 9 (asserting that the Court should be 
aware that just because a practice is the European consensus, that does not 
necessarily make it an admirable standard). 
 130. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (highlighting key documents of the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice Commission which 
recommend limits on criminal disenfranchisement). 
 131. See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, European Consensus and the Evolutive 
Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J. 
1730, 1742 (2011) (emphasizing that the Court needs to make evolutive 
interpretation more predictable to maintain process legitimacy); see also 
FRANÇOISE TULKENS, EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DIALOGUE BETWEEN 
JUDGES 2011: WHAT ARE THE LIMITS TO THE EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONVENTION? 8 (2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
D901069F-76A0-401F-BF48-248FC80E728A/0/DIALOGUE_2011_EN.pdf 
(commenting as a Section President of the ECHR, Tulkens noted that one of the 
major criticisms of evolutive interpretation is that it threatens democratic 
legitimacy). 
 132. See ARAI-TAKAHASHI, supra note 8, at 196 (“[T]he comparative method 
should be better employed to construe the meaning and scope of the Convention 
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C. THE DECISION IN SCOPPOLA (NO. 3) IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS WHEN ANALYZED IN 
THE CONTEXT OF RECENT INTERNATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS AND 
PRISONERS’ RIGHTS DOCUMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 31(3)(C) OF THE 
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
The text of Article 3 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights states simply that the Contracting 
Parties shall hold free elections, at regular intervals, under conditions 
that ensure the free expression of the people in the choice of 
legislature.133 This does not answer the question of whether the Court 
was correct in upholding the Italian disenfranchisement law in 
Scoppola (No. 3); in this situation, it is instructive to use Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention to evaluate whether the Italian 
law is consistent with international norms. 
1. The Stated Aims of Criminal Disenfranchisement  
in the Scoppola (No. 3) Decision Are Inconsistent  
with International Norms of Penal Policy 
Article 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights covers the general treatment of prisoners, mandating that they 
be treated with the respect and dignity of the human person and that 
the primary aim of the penitentiary system be the reformation and 
social rehabilitation of the prisoner.134 This formulation necessarily 
invites an analysis of whether the aims of criminal 
disenfranchisement enumerated by the Italian government in 
Scoppola (No. 3) conform to this mandate.  
  The Court in Scoppola (No. 3) accepted wholesale the Grand 
Chamber’s analysis in Hirst (No. 2) that the criminal 
disenfranchisement law served the legitimate aims of “preventing 
crime and enhancing civic responsibility for the rule of law.”135 
 
terms in such a way as to reinforce and widen the protection of rights and 
freedoms.”). 
 133. First Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3. 
 134. ICCPR, supra note 86, art. 10(1), (3) (“All persons deprived of their liberty 
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person . . . The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners 
the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation.”). 
 135. See Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 13  
(2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-111044 (citing 
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Evaluating both of these aims in light of Article 10 of the ICCPR 
demonstrates their inconsistency with international norms.  
The first aim purports to enhance civic responsibility and respect 
for the rule of law. Disenfranchisement does precisely the 
opposite.136 In a democratic society, the legitimacy of the 
government is derived from the will of the people; for the legislature, 
elected by the people, to restrict the right of some people to choose 
the legislature is inherently delegitimizing.137 Furthermore, criminal 
disenfranchisement is contrary to the principle of universal suffrage, 
which the European Court of Human Rights has called the baseline 
of protection.138 
The governments in both the Scoppola (No. 3) and Hirst (No. 2) 
cases argue that criminal disenfranchisement is necessary to teach 
convicts respect for the rule of law.139 Disenfranchisement achieves 
the opposite end here, as well.140 The clearest lesson that 
 
to sections 74 and 75 of the Hirst (No. 2) decision for the statement of the 
legitimate aim). 
 136. See Sauvé v. Canada (No. 2), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, ¶ 31 (Can.) (stating that 
denying inmates the right to vote undermines the rights of all Canadians by 
misrepresenting the nature of the right). 
 137. See id. at ¶ 34 (“A government that restricts the franchise to a select portion 
of citizens is a government that weakens its ability to function as the legitimate 
representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardizes its claim to representative 
democracy, and erodes the basis of its right to convict and punish law-breakers.”); 
see also Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 18 (acknowledging that departures from 
universal suffrage undermine the democratic validity of the legislature and the 
laws that it promulgates, and such departures cannot be made without 
justification). 
 138. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 17 (restating the principle from 
Mathieu-Mohin that, in a democratic society, there is a presumption against 
restrictions on the franchise because voting is a right, not a privilege); see also 
Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 209 (using the United Kingdom’s gradual 
expansion of the franchise to all groups to demonstrate the transition from the view 
of voting as a privilege to voting as a right). 
 139. See id. at 207 (“The Government argued that the disqualification in this 
case pursued the intertwined legitimate aims of preventing crime and punishing 
offenders and enhancing civic responsibility and the rule of law.”). 
 140. See Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchisement with 
Citizenship Theory, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 53, 92 (2006) (“Given that over 
95% of prisoners and all parolees and probationers are re-released into the 
community, the edification of convicts’ virtue is a matter of pressing importance . . 
. . By placing a mark of infamy on convicts, disenfranchisement can . . . increase 
the incidence of recidivism and impede the assimilation of released offenders.”). 
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disenfranchisement teaches the offender is that he is less than 
others.141 Indeed, the United Kingdom made clear in Hirst (No. 2) 
that it believed prisoners, by virtue of their imprisonment, lost the 
moral authority to participate in the decisions of society.142 
Furthermore, the Italian law at issue in Scoppola (No. 3) does not 
even mandate that the disenfranchisement penalty be announced at 
sentencing, delaying any educative impact until the prisoner 
discovers his disenfranchisement on his own.143 
The final aim of the disenfranchisement law, preventing crime by 
enhancing punishment, is so broad and vague an aim that it could be 
said of nearly all penal measures.144 It also implies that the 
withdrawal of vital human rights beyond the right of liberty is a 
justifiable punishment, a concept that conflicts with the European 
Prison Rules promulgated by the Council of Europe.145 
The aims articulated by the Italian government in Scoppola (No. 3) 
do not emphasize the reintegration and reintroduction of the offender 
into society and indeed may actually achieve the opposite, further 
alienating the offender from society and exacerbating the difficulty 
of reentry into society. Evaluating these aims in light of 
contemporary international documents such as the ICCPR, the 
European Prison Rules, and the United Nations Basic Principles for 
 
 141. See Lukas Muntingh & Julia Sloth-Nielsen, The Ballot as a Bulwark: 
Prisoners’ Right to Vote in South Africa, supra note 117, at 234 (quoting a South 
African Constitutional Court case stating that the vote is a classless signifier of 
unity among democratic citizens); see also Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 207–08 
(including in the decision third-party prisoners’ rights campaigners who argued 
that disenfranchisement furthers the exclusion of the convict); Sauvé, 3 S.C.R. 519, 
¶ 35 (citing to the same South African case, which holds that the vote signifies that 
“everybody counts”). 
 142. See Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 207 (stating the opinion of the British 
government that criminals, by virtue of their crime, violated the social contract and 
were no longer entitled to have a say in the governance of their country). 
 143. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 27 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting) (noting 
that beyond imposing a sentence of greater than three years imprisonment, the 
Italian courts do not inform the prisoner that he is being disenfranchised). 
 144. See Sauvé, 3 S.C.R. 519, ¶ 22 (stating that a broad and abstract objective, 
such as enhancing respect for the rule of law and ensuring appropriate punishment, 
are susceptible to different meanings in different contexts and, consequently, to 
distortion and manipulation). 
 145. See European Prison Rules, supra note 89, Rule 102.2 (“Imprisonment is 
by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself and therefore the regime for 
sentenced prisoners shall not aggravate the suffering inherent in imprisonment.”). 
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the Treatment of Prisoners under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention, demonstrates that criminal disenfranchisement, at least 
for the aims articulated in Scoppola (No. 3), are not consistent with 
the obligation to hold free elections under Article 3 of the First 
Protocol. 
2. Contemporary International Documents on Voting Rights 
Recommend the Abolition of Criminal Disenfranchisement in Nearly 
Every Context 
Article 25 of the ICCPR only prohibits “unreasonable restrictions” 
on the right to vote, an inherently subjective criterion that does not 
definitively answer whether the Italian criminal disenfranchisement 
law at issue in the Scoppola (No. 3) case would violate that 
provision. However, the analysis of the Court in Scoppola (No. 3) is 
demonstrably inconsistent with recommendations of both the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and the Venice 
Commission. Both bodies indicate which restrictions on the right to 
vote are acceptable by recommending that criminal 
disenfranchisement as punishment for a crime be imposed only for 
crimes against the political process and by the express decision of a 
court of law.146  
The Court in Scoppola (No. 3) touches on both of these issues in 
its analysis of proportionality.147 With respect to the recommendation 
that disenfranchisement only be imposed for serious crimes, the 
Court actually stated that this factor weighed in favor of finding the 
law proportionate because the Italian law does not disenfranchise 
those convicted with sentences of less than three years.148 The Court 
also heavily emphasizes that another factor in finding the 
disenfranchisement law proportionate as a whole is that it also 
provides for disenfranchisement of those convicted of crimes against 
 
 146. See discussion supra Part II.D.2 (discussing recent international documents 
that recommend restrictions on criminal disenfranchisement). 
 147. See discussion supra Part III.A (analyzing the inconsistency between the 
Court’s analysis of proportionality in Scoppola (No. 3) and Hirst (No. 2)). 
 148. See Scoppola (No. 3), App. No. 126/05, at 23 (opining that, because the 
Italian law does not disenfranchise those convicted to sentences of less than three 
years, the Italian government has taken care to ensure that disenfranchisement is 
limited to being a punishment for major crimes). 
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the State or judicial system, as in the Labita case.149 The Court’s 
interpretation of the Italian law remains inconsistent with the 2005 
recommendation of the Parliamentary Assembly, which recommends 
that disenfranchisement be applied only to crimes against the State or 
democratic process; whether an unacceptable restriction on the right 
to vote adjoins an acceptable restriction should not be a factor in 
finding the unacceptable restriction acceptable.150 
The Scoppola (No. 3) Court in its proportionality analysis 
explicitly rejects the recommendation that disenfranchisement should 
only be imposed by the express decision of a court.151 The Court 
relies instead on the Italian guidelines for determining the length of a 
sentence, which allow for consideration of individual circumstances 
in deciding the length of the sentence and whether 
disenfranchisement is imposed.152 This interpretation does not 
conform to the Venice Commission’s recommendations, which 
specifically state that the removal of voting rights can only be a 
subsidiary penalty where there is a judicial determination of mental 
incapacity and not merely a criminal conviction.153 
The Venice Commission’s recommendations also state that the 
standard for the removal of the right to run for public office may be 
less strict than for the removal of voting rights.154 This 
 
 149. See id. at 22-23 (acknowledging that the Italian law also provides for 
disenfranchisement based on other criteria besides length of sentence, even though 
the situation in the case only involved disenfranchisement by length of sentence). 
 150. See Abolition of Restrictions on the Right to Vote, supra note 92, ¶ 8 
(referencing the judgment in Hirst (No. 2) when urging Member States to 
reconsider all disenfranchisement laws not specifically tied to crimes against the 
democratic process). 
 151. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 21 (finding that while judicial 
intervention is useful for determining whether a measure is proportionate, a 
measure should not be automatically found to be disproportionate if it was not 
issued by a judge). 
 152. See id. at 22–23 (emphasizing the discretion of the Italian judicial system in 
determining the length of the sentence as a factor in finding the Italian law 
proportionate). 
 153. See Venice Commission, supra note 93, at 15 (explaining that the 
automatic removal of a person’s voting rights by operation of law is only 
acceptable when there is a finding of mental incapacity). 
 154. See id. (asserting that the bar may be lower for the removal of the right to 
run for public office because there is a greater public interest in preventing 
dangerous people from obtaining public office than merely preventing them from 
voting). 
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recommendation creates inconsistency with the Italian law, which 
explicitly frames the removal of voting rights as a subsidiary penalty 
to the loss of the right to run for public office.155 Furthermore, the 
Italian law does not require courts to announce an offender’s 
disenfranchisement at sentencing, so the offender may not even be 
aware that he has lost the right to vote.156 
The Scoppola (No. 3) Court points to the possibility of early 
release from prison and of a rehabilitation hearing reinstating the 
offender’s right to vote as factors for finding the Italian system 
proportionate.157 This interpretation runs counter to the Venice 
Commission’s recommendations, allowing for an express hearing on 
disenfranchisement only after it has already been imposed, rather 
than before.158 
Lastly, the decision of the Scoppola (No. 3) Court is inconsistent 
with these international norms because it upholds a law that neither 
provides for an independent judicial determination of the 
disenfranchisement penalty nor restricts disenfranchisement to 
political crimes or crimes against the democratic process.  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The inconsistent ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Scoppola (No. 3) creates uncertainty in the international legal 
community about how States should adjust their laws to comport 
with minimum Convention standards.159 To that end, there are 
 
 155. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 28 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting) 
(opining that there is no link between the loss of the right to run for public office 
and the loss of the right to vote). 
 156. See id. at 27 (Björgvinsson, J., dissenting) (noting that the Italian law, as 
applied to Mr. Scoppola, did not notify him of his disenfranchisement at his 
sentencing except that he was sentenced to imprisonment for greater than five 
years). 
 157. See id. at 23 (emphasizing that the possibility of early release and 
rehabilitation show that the Italian system is not “excessively rigid”). 
 158. See Venice Commission, supra note 93, at 15 (emphasizing that the express 
decision of a court of law must be applied to the withdrawal of political rights, not 
their reinstatement). 
 159. See generally Cesare Pitea, Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3): The Grand Chamber 
Faces the “Constitutional Justice vs. Individual Justice” Dilemma (But It 
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changes that should be made to both the Convention and the Court’s 
jurisprudence that would produce more consistent results and provide 
better guidance to the Contracting Parties. 
A. THE CONVENTION SHOULD BE AMENDED TO ADD AN EXPLICIT 
LIMITATIONS CLAUSE TO ARTICLE 3 OF THE FIRST PROTOCOL 
The Council of Europe should amend Article 3 of the First 
Protocol by adding an explicit limitations clause to narrow the 
margin of appreciation in the area of voting rights, similar to those 
found in Articles 8 through 11 of the Convention that impose 
specific limitations on how States may violate rights protected by the 
Convention.160 For example, Article 9(2) reads that a State may only 
violate a person’s freedom of religion if it is prescribed by law, 
necessary in a democratic society, done for the protection of public 
order, health, or morals, or to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others.161 Such a limitations clause, added to Article 3 of the First 
Protocol, should prohibit the disenfranchisement of criminals except 
when necessary for the preservation of a democratic society. This 
result would reflect the narrow margin of appreciation for restrictions 
on the right to vote advocated by Judge Björgvinsson in his Scoppola 
(No. 3) dissent.162 
B. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE SHOULD CONVENE A COMMITTEE TO 
STUDY HOW THE INTEGRATION OF POST-SOVIET EASTERN 
EUROPEAN STATES HAS AFFECTED THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
The European Court of Human Rights maintains a unique 
position: balancing principles like “effective political democracy” 
and the “rule of law” on the one hand, while basing its decisions in 
the consent of the Member States on the other.163 A major issue with 
 
doesnt-tell/ (lamenting the Scoppola (No. 3) Court’s lack of guidance to States that 
desire to bring their policies in line with the Convention). 
 160. See HARRIS et al., supra note 5, at 344 (“The conditions upon which a state 
may interfere with the enjoyment of a protected right are set out in elaborate terms 
in the second paragraphs of Articles 8–11.”) 
 161. ECHR, supra note 5, art. 9(2) (imposing express limitations on the ability 
of States to limit the freedom of religion). 
 162. See Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 17 (contrasting the broad margin of 
appreciation on the issue of electoral systems with the narrow margin of 
appreciation on the issue of individual voting rights). 
 163. See Carozza, supra note 125, at 1232 (“[T]he Court is at one and the same 
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maintaining the consent of the governed is the broadening of the 
margin of appreciation due to the inclusion of post-Soviet states that 
do not share the western European heritage of democracy and the 
rule of law. To that end, the Council of Europe should convene a 
committee to evaluate whether the margin of appreciation on 
criminal disenfranchisement has grown over the two decades since 
the fall of communism. This does not necessarily require the Council 
to take any action beyond studying the issue; however, the lack of 
clarity in this area leads to inconsistent outcomes, as demonstrated in 
the Hirst (No. 2) and Scoppola (No. 3) cases. 
C. THE COURT SHOULD CHANGE ITS PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS 
TO REQUIRE THAT DISENFRANCHISEMENT ONLY BE ALLOWABLE 
BY THE EXPRESS DECISION OF A COURT 
The Council of Europe should adopt into the Convention the 
recommendations of the Venice Commission issued in its 2002 Code 
of Good Practice in Electoral Matters.164 Adopting these 
recommendations would help the Court uphold the mandate of the 
Convention to sustain “effective political democracy” when 
assessing criminal disenfranchisement.165 The 2002 Code of Good 
Practice recommends that the withdrawal of any political rights must 
only be possible through the express decision of a court. 166 
Incorporating this recommendation into the Convention would help 
clarify how courts should approach arbitrary and indiscriminate laws 
like those struck down by the Court in Hirst (No. 2) and upheld in 
Scoppola (No. 3). This change would require courts to independently 
 
time caught between the need to uphold a set of normative principles that are 
outside the will of the Member States and the need to ground its decisions to some 
degree in the consent of the Member States.”). 
 164. See Venice Commission, supra note 93, at 15 (enumerating the conditions 
under which a person may be deprived of the right to vote). 
 165. See generally Council of Europe Venice Commission, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/Presentation_E.asp, (last visited Dec. 20, 
2012) [hereinafter Venice Commission Website] (explaining the role of the 
Commission as an advisory board of academics convened on behalf of the Council 
of Europe to advise the Council members on Constitutional matters, and noting 
that all members of the Council of Europe are members of the Commission); see 
also Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 10 (citing the above noted provisions of the 
Venice Commission document, such as how the proportionality principle must be 
observed). 
 166. Venice Commission, supra note 93, at 6. 
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consider disenfranchisement as a punishment, not as an ancillary 
penalty167 or one conferred automatically upon conviction.168 
Considering that as of the Scoppola (No. 3) decision on May 12, 
2012, thirty-six of the forty-three Convention Contracting Parties 
impose some kind of restrictions on criminal disenfranchisement,169 
requiring that courts independently consider disenfranchisement as a 
punishment based on the circumstances of the crime should easily 
fall within the evolutive interpretation of the Convention.170 
More drastic measures may be necessary, however; if that is the 
case, the Court should adopt a proportionality analysis similar to the 
analysis in Sauvé v. Canada (No. 2), which requires a rational 
relationship between the legitimate aim and the measure intended to 
further it.171 This is especially pertinent where there is evidence that 
the State’s measures work counter to the aim they purport to 
pursue.172 
Adopting this standard would not invalidate all criminal 
disenfranchisement laws. In fact, laws such as the one upheld in 
Labita would still be presumptively valid. Preventing an accused or 
convicted mafioso from voting is rationally related to maintaining an 
“effective political democracy” and is consistent with the Hirst (No. 
2) Court’s explicit allowance for disenfranchisement laws that 
protect the political system.173 
 
 167. Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 6 (“In the Italian legal system a ban from 
public office is an ancillary penalty which entails forfeiture of the right to vote.”). 
 168. Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 197 (describing the British criminal 
disenfranchisement statute). 
 169. Scoppola, App. No. 126/05, at 10–11 (summarizing the state of criminal 
disenfranchisement laws among the Contracting Parties). See generally 
Macdonald, supra note 3, at 1386–87 (discussing the various forms of criminal 
disenfranchisement laws, including a reference to a Luxembourg law that allowed 
criminals to regain the right to vote by determination of the Grand Duke, which 
received negative feedback from the Human Right Council). 
 170. See discussion supra Part II (explaining the “great majority” standard in the 
evolutive interpretation). 
 171. See discussion supra Part III (providing further analysis of the Sauvé (No. 
2) standard). 
 172. See Sauvé v. Canada (No. 2), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, 555 (Can.) (“Denying 
prisoners the right to vote imposes negative costs on prisoners and on the penal 
system. It removes a route to social development and rehabilitation acknowledged 
since the time of [John Stuart] Mill, and it undermines correctional law and policy 
directed towards rehabilitation and integration.”). 
 173. Hirst, 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. at 212 (stating that while tolerance and 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case 
of Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3) demonstrates how contentious the issue 
of criminal disenfranchisement is in Europe. Not only is the 
judgment in that case inconsistent with the previous analysis of the 
Court in the Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) case, it also 
demonstrates how the current analysis is inconsistent with an 
evolutive interpretation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. By analyzing the Convention in the context of recent 
international documents on voting rights and prisoner’s rights under 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, the current analysis 
allowing general disenfranchisement is untenable in a world where 
prisoners are regarded as citizens and the ballot is a right, not a 
privilege. While the current approach is the source of much 
confusion, there is an opportunity here for the Council of Europe to 
clarify the Convention to ensure that the voting rights of prisoners 
are protected to the full extent promised by the Convention. 
 
 
broadmindedness are hallmarks of a democratic society, such a society need not 
tolerate activities which are designed to destroy rights protected by the 
Convention). 
